with similar grievances and facilitates the creation of communal feeling. 6 And yet, what is usually forgotten is that even in this case two elements are needed: first, a core of hard-line devotees who prepare the information and carry out the initial dissemination to accumulate a critical mass of followers and make it viral; second, a set of grievances and other motivations that would turn the general public into users (and possibly disseminators) of such information (and even more serious grievances to cause action 'on the ground', which requires more effort and possibly sacrifice) -in other words, potentiality has to turn into actuality. Social media has not changed either of these. What is even more, the challenge to turn online activism and engagement into activities 'offline' is even more difficult because the internet tends to create weak ties of users rather than of members. 7 Finally, despite the fact that internet users participating in the revolution were more informed and more active than non-users, 8 the causal link is still unclear: it is highly possible that these people were already active before embracing the internet and the choice of means was merely incidental or a strategic addition an already pre-existing arsenal.
The representation of social media in the case of the UK riots was once again very different. Here it was not a space of liberation (or, if it was, then of very specific liberation indeed). This media, and especially the Blackberry Messenger (BBM), was indeed widely used by the youths to organise themselves and transmit ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 2 2013 128 information. 9 But here it also achieved a certain quasi-mystical quality of an impenetrable place where vice and anarchy persevere -once again, especially concerning the BBM due to the impossibility to retrieve and decipher its messages, in contrast to the more open and conventional spaces of Facebook and Twitter. In either case, the ideas to switch off not necessarily the entire internet but at least some of its services sounded eerily similar to those voiced earlier in Egypt. And, once again, the question remains as to why one should follow the threads in social media and act accordingly, i.e. less of than from other motivation(s). What is more, participation in rioting and looting appeared to be based more on individual decision than on significant social interaction. 10 In the case of Egypt (but also the Middle East in general), chronic corruption, often directly related with foreign aid, multiple failures of important social and infrastructure projects, and socioeconomic disparities were key factors in causing massive discontent. 11 Although there is a tendency to see the revolution as a generational conflict between the young, dynamic, internet-literate, and prodemocratic generation and the aging autocratic one, 12 as correctly noted by
Swenson, this was not entirely the case as many of the grievances were shared across the society and generations. As a result, it was a response to the deficiencies of the system as such and not some primordial striving for democracy and larger freedom that united the protesters, as illustrated by subsequent developments. And then it must be stressed that, contrary to widespread representations, liberal democracy is only one of the options put forward by a segment of society -one end of a spectrum where the other extreme is Islamic theocracy, and a plethora of other forms lie in-between them. 13 What is even more, the image we have of the revolution was formed by the internet users themselves in a way that most reflects their attitudes and experiences but a significant portion of the protesters remained unrepresented because it had no means to make its voice heard.
14 Notably, demonstrations should not be seen as an exceptional event in
Egyptian politics. Minor outbreaks were common and therefore the revolution should be seen as having been in the making for years. 15 Thus one could speak about the importance of a vision or a mental model that had developed over time The attempts to explain the UK riots are much more diverse as they tend to be motivated first and foremost by the ideological orientation and political aims of the commentators, but most of them are still entirely speculative. 21 The only thing everyone seems to agree on is that there are serious social and economic problems underlying British society, but the interpretations of causes and presentations of possible cures vary significantly. Those on the left of the political spectrum usually tend either to equate the riots with the crisis of global capitalism (and see them as "an explosion of rage and market-driven greed" 22 rather than motivated by political goals) or to emphasise rising deprivation, inequality, and spending cuts by the Conservative-led coalition government, 23 thus returning to the domain of politics.
Meanwhile, those on the right prefer to stress 'sick communities', 'moral decay', 'poor parenting', and, in the words of David Cameron, a 'broken society'. 24 Meanwhile, a third possible perspective is to concentrate on the general moral 17 Ibid.: 227-228. 18 
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It is worth noting that, for Lacan, in an object of desire "there is from the beginning something other than use value. There is its jouissance use," 33 i.e. the satisfaction that a person attributes to the object. Needless to say, the actual satisfaction is always less than expected, leaving the subject to constantly transfer his/her desire to yet another thing. 34 Political reality (as any other reality), on its own part, is a phantasmatic coherence produced through a specific ordering of meaning and value attached to objects and phenomena -the symbolic structure of ideas that governs desire and facilitates its transference when needed. 35 As stressed by Lacan, 'I see outside', 36 namely, perception lies in the order external to the subject that nevertheless is the essence of the subject's constitution.
Consequently, law and power are not only external -they are also internal, deeply rooted in a subject's desire. 37 As a result, politics is about providing enjoyment for the people and satisfying their desire. However, since no satisfaction is enough, it is also about creating new promises of enjoyment (as well as actual satisfaction) in order to channel desire. When, due to some reason, the chain of satisfaction gets stuck, discontent arises.
The riots in the UK and the revolution in Egypt could indeed be seen as the Lacanian Real perforating the symbolic ordering of the world that we live in -as the 'heart of darkness' in which horror persists. In both cases discussed, it was the lack of enjoyment that broke through the law, although the issues at stake were undoubtedly very different: from basic economic, social and political deprivation of protesters to the narcissism of boasting looters. Accordingly, the presence (in Egypt) or absence (in UK) of notable organisation and attempt to bring about change was visible. One more possible way would be to see the events through the lens of Benjamin's conceptualisation of violence. Indeed, as seen in Egypt, "all lawpreserving violence, in its duration, indirectly weakens the lawmaking violence represented by it, through the suppression of hostile counterviolence" 38 until there is a new power strong enough to triumph. Meanwhile, the UK events could be seen as 'divine violence' which neither makes nor preserves law, accepting sacrifice not for some complete emancipation but only in the name of abstract justice as such (in Benjamin's own words, "the sign and seal but never the means of sacred examples of Egypt and the UK show that the social media is still a terra incognita in the field of political signification: a space of whatever, to which the most varied qualities could be ascribed depending upon convenience, from the utopia of a free society to the dystopia of a channel for darkest desires. Nowhere in his analysis is this reading so well executed as in his analysis of an informal and spontaneous early-morning post-riot interview with two young females. The exchange warrants quoting in its entirety:
--Everyone was just going to riot, just going mad. Like chucking things, chucking bottles. Breaking stuff.
--It was good, though. It was madness. Good fun.
--Yea, good fun.
[Interviewer]: So you're drinking a bottle of rose wine at half-nine in the morning?
--Yea, free alcohol.
[Interviewer]: Have you been drinking all night?
--Yea, yea. It was the government's fault. Conservatives.
--It's not even a riot, we're just showing the police we do what we want.
--Yea, and now we have.
[Interviewer]: Do you think it will go on tonight?
--Hopefully!
[Interviewer]: But these are local people, why is it targeting local people?
--It's the rich people, the people that got businesses, and that's why all of this happened. Because of the rich people. The importance of this interview as a statement representative of the London riots is underscored by the eventual answer provided by Swenson: the actions taken were "a collective expression of agency on the part ("we") of the young and dispossessed against those with property." 49 The young women portray the situation with an "us versus them" logic, in which the role of the enemy is played by the conservatives, the police, and the rich. As Swenson notes, "far from feeling any obligation to or association with those in their own neighborhood, these girls clearly express a theory of class that is not about work, region, or identity, but simply the distinction between those who have something and those who have nothing." 50 At bottom, it points to an extreme, and extremely simplistic, but still valid socio-economic concern. So perhaps it is anxiety as a kind of danger signal that led many to dismiss the riots as nothing more than senseless violence and the 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. it is the rioters' pleasure gained through a certain mode of self-destruction (i.e. at the very least, targeting their own neighborhoods with violence). Jouissance is a mode of enjoying your own symptom(s). Lorenzo Chiesa reminds us that Spinoza theorizes a similar brand of pleasure as titillatio-the pleasure, pain, and panic of being tickled, and "who does not like being tickled?" 53 We tend to understand jouissance as an impossible form of wholeness and a consistency of enjoyment that we attribute to the Other as something denied to us. We sustain our belief in this excessive jouissance via fantasy, and, as Slavoj Žižek contends, one of the key socio-politically related fantasies is that the Other has stolen our jouissance. 54 The
London interview scene with the young women allegorically stages the fantasy of the theft of jouissance. As if to further drive home their point, the girls are laughing and enjoying themselves, having 'lifted' numerous items in the looting, including the rosé wine they have apparently been imbibing throughout the night and into the early morning. This interview becomes a convenient image for attributing excessive enjoyment to the hordes of otherwise seemingly faceless rioters. 55 In terms of perception, the political stakes revolve around whether the rioters are understood as 'merely' enjoying the transgression, or whether that pleasure is equally a jouissance that they enjoy precisely because they are depriving the rich, or the police, or any (perceived or otherwise) preserver of the status quo, of an The benefit of drawing from psychoanalysis to expand on insights from Therefore, the participants could be everyone and no one at the same time. The problem with the application of the framework of the political by Chantal Mouffe for this context is that the active participants themselves did not actively identify with any possible "we", though "they" in the interviews and media articles were named as the police, the rich, etc. Therefore "we" could be regarded as those that are not police and not rich, but this political identity seems to be neither consistent, nor giving hope for a consistent future of otherwise inconsistent groups of people.
In a different theorization of politics, Jacques Rancière proposes that a line be drawn between police and politics. According to Rancière, the police is "first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that speech is understood as discourse an another as Rancière's framework suggests a similar yet discrete direction. The people who were called rioters by the media could be regarded as those who have no part; therefore, the moment of equality can never arise, because by definition there is no part in society for those who have no part. According to this logic, the London riots were not a political event. However, the event very much happened within the dimension of the Rancierian police, which defines the ways of being, saying and assigning bodies by name to the ways of doing and certain tasks. Swenson states how in their news coverage correspondents for the BBC were ordered by the management to change the term "protesters" to "rioters." As Swenson explains, "protester" has a more positive connotation than "rioter," since rioters are those people who are out to steal and loot. 70 One could argue that the people participating in the events used their own media to organize the events (e.g.
it was well reported that participants used Blackberry messengers to organize the attacks on the shops), but the function of this media is precisely organizational, not informative and therefore not discursive.
As participants of the London events are, in Rancierian terms, beings of no "ac/count," they cannot be held accountable for their words. Therefore, the mechanism of what they do, say and mean. In the words of Rancière, the functioning of mass media in this case could be regarded as police-"an order of bodies" that defines how the events in London came to be, how they were put into practice, and what could be said about them. In other words, the mass media polices-in the strong Rancierian sense of that term-"ways of doing, ways of being, ways of saying." 71 By labeling the participants of the events in London "rioters," the mass media assigns them a name. As Rancière notes, "bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task," and therefore the people are given the name which belongs to the discourse of the riots. 72 The mass media defines an order of bodies and assigns those bodies to a particular discursive place-here, a riot-and a task-here, to riot. This does not mean that the mass media directly influences the scope of rioting, but more that the actions of the people are defined as rioting. This order of bodies designates "that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that speech is understood as discourse and another as noise." 73 In the mediated order of bodies media tells us that the fires in neighborhoods are visible as violent, destructive acts, but not as a cry for help, and that the noise of showcase window glass breaking is understood as vandalism, but not as a complaint. And in the context of destruction, looting, and rioting there is rarely a note about the reasons for conscious or unconscious motivation for such activities.
As Rancière notes, policing is not about the discipline imposed on the bodies, but the rules by which the distribution of the space occupied by certain people are organized: "Policing is not so much the 'disciplining' of bodies as a rule governing their appearing, it is a configuration of occupations and the properties of the spaces where those occupations are distributed." 74 In other words, policing is implemented not by forced rules and disciplines for bodies, but by distributing the spaces and their properties. Mass media can be understood as an example of a tool of the police. First of all, the police state the properties of the span taken by certain groups in mass media space: the entrance barrier to the mass media space (e.g. "symbolic enrollment in the city". He writes that, "they do not speak because they are beings without a name, deprived of logos -meaning, of symbolic enrollment in the city." 75 The participants of the events in London themselves do not speak in mass media because they are "beings without a name" -they do not have any channels representing them and therefore they are deprived of logos, of speech, opinion, account. As they cannot express their ac/count, they are deprived of enrollment in the city, i.e. they are not counted as citizens. The media (as) police defines the quantity and quality of the media space that the participants of the events occupy. Media defines the symbolic enrollment in the mediated city and assigns bodies to those particular places and tasks. The activities that are visible and the speech that is understood as discourse are the result of the media (as) police. Following Rancierian logic, 'media police' can be defined as one of the institutions through which an order is created in the context of the conflictuality provided by the political. Therefore, the events in London could be understood as the context of conflictuality in which the societal order is created through institutions, a critical one of which is mass media. "Political activity," according to Rancière, "is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place's destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise." 76 In this sense, the events in London were not political activities. However, the events in London were police activities, through which the media (as police) distributed, assigned, and displayed a configuration of speaking bodies: those who can speak and be heard and those who simply cannot. 75 Ibid., p. 23. 76 Ibid., p. 30.
